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JURISDICTION OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD OVER THE BUILDING
AND CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
JoE E. COviNGTON*
Prior to June 1947 almost two million of the nation-wide total of
fifteen million union members had little contact with the National Labor
Relations Board because of the Board's refusal to exercise jurisdiction
over the building and construction industry. This refusal to act was
not grounded on a lack of power, but rather in the belief that an "asser-
tion of jurisdiction would not effectuate the policies of the Act."' The
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947,2 commonly known as the
Taft-Hartley Act, covered several phases of labor relations, such as
secondary boycotts and jurisdictional disputes, which were not regu-
lated by the Wagner Act,3 yet the provisions relating to coverage under
the commerce clause remained the same.4 However, it was but a short
time after the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act until mention was
being made of the "new interpretation of interstate commerce" being
given this provision. Mr. Denham, General Counsel for the National
Labor Relations Board, testifying before a House of Representatives
subcommittee, took the position that the Act applies to almost every
business enterprise in the nation.5 Coupled with this position is his
belief that in secondary boycott cases, exercise of this jurisdiction is
mandatory.6 Earlier statements by the General Counsel had caused
this special subcommittee of the House Committee on Expenditures in
the Executive Departments to hold hearings in connection with its "In-
*Executive Assistant to the President and Professor of Law, University of
Arkansas; B.A., LL.B., University of Arkansas; LL.M., Harvard Law School.
I Brown & Root, 51 N. L. R. B. 820 (1943) ; Johns Manville, 61 N. L. R. B. 1
(1945). Cf. Brown Shipbuilding Co., 57 N. L. R. B. 326 (1944) (jurisdiction
accepted over construction workers regularly employed in a manufacturing plant).
'Pub. L. No. 101, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 29 U. S. C. A. §141 et seq. (Supp.
1948).
149 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. §151 et seq. (1940).
'Section 10(a) of both the Wagner Act and the Taft-Hartley Act, 29
U. S. C. A. §160 (Supp. 1948), empowers the Board to "prevent any person from
engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in Section 8) affecting comnmerce,'
Section 9(c) provides for an election when "a question of representation affecting
commerce exists." The terms "commerce" and "affecting commerce" are defined
in Section 2(6) and 2(7).
'Hearings before Subcomnittees of the Committee on Education and Labor
and the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments on investigation
to ascertain Scope of Interpretation by General Counsel of National Labor Rela-
tions Board of the Term "Affecting Commerce," as used in the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act. 1947, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. 18 (1948).
OId. at 17.
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vestigation to Ascertain Scope of Interpretation by General Counsel of
National Labor Relations Board of the term 'Affecting Commerce' as
used in the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947." The report of
this subcommittee severely criticized the interpretation offered by the
General Counsel.
7
One of the first industries to be included in this broader coverage was
the building and construction industry. After long behind-the-scenes
conferences Mr. Denham announced in a speech to the Associated Gen-
eral Contractors on February 11, 1948 that the Board would extend its
coverage to the industry.8 The National Labor Relations Board had
never elaborated on its decisions refusing to exercise jurisdiction over
the industry, but presumably this refusal was because of the difficulty
of applying the procedures established by the Wagner Act to industrial
relations in the industry and because the Act was concerned with repre-
sentation questions and employer unfair labor practices, areas in which
building trades employees needed no assistance.
The major obstacle in applying the representation procedure of the
Wagner Act to the building and construction industry was the short
term employer-employee relationship which is typical in the industry.
Construction jobs ordinarily last for only a few months and it is not
uncommon for a worker to work for several employers in a single
season. Because of the peripatetic employment practices in the indus-
try, an election by workers presently employed would determine the
bargaining agent for a group of employees almost entirely different from
those voting in the election. Nor were the building trades workers
particularly concerned over employer unfair labor practices. Workers
in the industry were staunchly organized, approximately eighty percent
being members of the nineteen American Federation of Labor building-
craft unions, and ninety-five percent of those under union agreement
worked in closed shops.9 Non-union building trades workers are gen-
erally confined to the less populated areas. Strikes and boycotts have
been singularly effective in the industry and the workers felt no need
to resort to the relief afforded by the Wagner Act. Contractors have
received some assistance from the unions in recruiting workers for jobs
and in restraining certain contractors who seek to depress construction
bids by offering lower wages. Because of these conditions the Board
did not deem it imperative to intervene in labor disputes in the building
and construction industry.
' H. R. Rep. No. 2050, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. 5 (1948).
121 Lab. Rel. Ref. Man. 44 (1948).
' PETERSON, AMERICAN LABOR UNIONS 204 (1945). For a review of labor rela-
tions in the building and construction industry, see HABER, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
IN THE BUILDING INDUSTRY (1930) ; How COLLECTIVE BARGAINING WORKS, TWEN-
TIETH CENTURY FUND, Ch. 4 (1942); MONTGOMERY, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN
THE CHICAGO BUILDING TRADES (1927); RYAN, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE
SAN FRANCISCO BUILDING TRADES (1935).
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The Taft-Hartley Act places an affirmative duty on the Board to
act in cases of trade jurisdictional disputes'0 and secondary boycotts"
Further, the Act is intended to eliminate closed-shop contracts, 12 and
it permits a union-shop contract only after an election is held under the
supervision of the Labor Board.' 3 Faced with these statutory restric-
tions unions have asserted that the building and construction industry
is "local" and not within the power of Congress under the commerce
clause. It is not easy to support such a contention in view of the many
extensive projects in the industry, often involving the direct shipment
in interstate commerce of millions of dollars worth of materials. It
seems certain that some areas of the industry are subject to regulation
under the Act. In fact, jurisdiction was exercised in a limited number
of building and construction cases under the Wagner Act.14  The areas
of industry in which the Board exercised its powers were fairly well
delineated under the Wagner Act, but the proposed broader coverage
under the Taft-Hartley Act, including coverage of labor relations in
the construction industry, calls for a new analysis of the Labor Board's
jurisdiction.15
DEVELOPMENT OF JURISDICTION UNDER COURT DECISION
As has been previously noted,' 6 the jurisdiction of the National
Labor Relations Board extends over unfair labor practices and ques-
tions of representation which "affect commerce." According to some
authorities this term was chosen with the deliberate intent of exercising
'1029 U. S. C. A. §160(k) (Supp. 1948).
2129 U. S. C. A. §160(1) (Supp. 1948). The Labor Board and its General
Counsel are presently engaged in a controversy over the question of the claimed
discretionary power of the Board to dismiss cases when it believes an assertion
of jurisdiction would not effectuate the policies of the Act. Hearings before Coin-
mittee on Labor and Public Welfare on S. 249, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1026 (1949).
A-1 Photo Service, 83 N. L. R. B. No. 86 (1949); Haleston Drug Store, Inc.,
86 N. L. R. B. No. 125, CCH 9358. The Board contends that in spite of the
rather pointed language in Section 10(1), it has discretionary power in secondary
boycott cases. The language of 10(k) is even more pointed, providing the Board
is "empowered and directed" to act. Judge Tamm of the United States District
Court, District of Columbia, has ruled that the Labor Board must hear all juris-
dictional dispute cases whenever a charge is made by an interested party. Par-
sons v. Herzog, 16 CCH Lab. Cas. No. 65,183 (1949).
1229 U. S. C. A. §158(a) (3) (Supp. 1948).
1229 U. S. C. A. §159(e) (Supp. 1948)
1N NLRB v. Austin Co., 165 F. 2d 592 (7th Cir. 1947) (employees in a central
office of company operating in several states) ; Isbell Construction Co., 27
N. L. R. B. 472 (1940) (road construction company doing some interstate work)." Jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board has been a favorite sub-
ject for writers. Some of the better discussions are contained in the following
articles: Nathanson, The Wagner Act Decisions Studied in Retrospect, 32 ILL. L.
REv. 196 (1937) ; Mueller, Business Subject to the National Labor Relations Act,
35 MI H. L. Rzv. 1286 (1937); Comments, 6 Gao. WASH. L. Rav. 436 (1937".
47 YALE L. J. 1221 (1938). 37 MicH. L. Rav. 934 (1939), 37 Micr. L. Rv. 1328
(1939). See also. Fallon, The Commerce Clause from the Schechter Case Throu.ah
the 1944-45 Tern, 19 TFMP. L. Q. 421 (1946); Stern. The Ceninerce Clause and
the National Economy. 1933, 1946. 59 HARv. L. Ray. 645. 883 (1946)
10 See.note 4 supra.
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the full power of Congress to regulate labor relations under the com-
merce clause, 17 and the Supreme Court has apparently accepted this
interpretation of the provision.18 Such an interpretation would make
the question one of the power of Congress to regulate labor relations
rather than a question of statutory construction.
At the outset the Labor Board's task of establishing jurisdiction
was difficult; unless it could operate in the field of manufacturing its
effectiveness would have been exceedingly limited. The Board was
faced with the then recent decisions of the Supreme Court, one holding
invalid a federal statute regulating hours and wages in the bituminous
coal industry' and another striking down a NIRA regulation affecting
commercial activities after interstate movement had ceased.20 Promi-
nent lawyers freely predicted the power of the Board did not extend to
local production.
21
The Board adopted a cogent method of presenting its cases to the
courts to illustrate vividly that local production and commerce were
intimately linked with interstate commerce and to deny Congress power
over these employers would permit labor disputes in local industry to
disrupt the flow of vast quantities of goods moving across state lines.
The Board set up a Division of Economic Research whose duty it was
to supply the economic facts and history of labor conditions in each
industry involved in proceedings before the Board.2 2 When the Board's
jurisdiction was seriously challenged, a mass of evidence was presented.
2 3
This included information on the size of the industry, the respondent's
position in the industry, the amount of production, the number of work-
ers, the source of materials, distribution of goods and similar facts. The
history of industrial relations in the industry and in respondent's busi-
ness was set forth.
Court sanction of the Board's jurisdiction over industries which
affect interstate commerce is based upon the same approach. To meet
the strong challenge of the Board's jurisdiction in the first decision
"7 Sen. Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1935). See also, H. R. Rep.
No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1935); Magruder, A Half Century of Legal
Influence Upon the Development of Collective Bargaining, 50 HARv. L. Rev. 1071,
1090 (1937).
" NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 31 (1937) ; NLRB v.
Fainblatt, 306 U. S. 601, 607 (1939); Polish National Alliance v. NLRB, 322
U. S. 643, 647 (1944) ; FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U. S. 349, 351 (1941). See also,
NLRB v. Suburban Lumber Co., 121 F. 2d 829, 832 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied,
314 U. S. 693 (1941).
"- Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 (1936).20 A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935).
2 Powell, Fifty-Eight Lawyers Report, 85 NEW REPUBLIC 119 (1937).
" See, NLRB Ann. Rep. 60 (1936) ; 2 NLRB Ann. Rep. 41 (1937) ; 3 NLRB
Ann. Rep. 124 (1938); 4 NLRB Ann. Rep. 152 (1939); 5 NLRB Ann. Rep. 245
(1940).
"See, Ziskind, The Use of Economic Data in Labor Cases, 6 U. OF Cui. L.
REv. 607, 624 (1939).
[Vol. 28
1949] NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 5
involving local production, the famous Jones & Laughlin case,24 the
Court took note of facts showing the respondent's business was a large
integrated concern of national importance owning and operating several
huge steel mills, connecting railroads, barges, ships and docks. The
employer shipped vast quantities of raw materials and finished products
in interstate commerce. The Court was convinced that labor relations
in such a powerful organization should be subject to the control of
Congress. Mr. Chief Justice Hughes stated:
... The fact remains that the stoppage of those operations by indus-
trial strife would have a most serious effect upon interstate com-
merce. . . . We have often said that interstate commerce itself is a
practical conception. It is equally true that interferences with that com-
merce must be appraised by a judgment that does not ignore actual
experience.
25
The facts demonstrated a. labor dispute in the central plant would "affect
commerce in such a close and intimate fashion as to be subject to fed-
eral control.
'26
A similar factual analysis in the Fruehauf Trailer case27 resulted in
approval of the Board's exercise of jurisdiction over an employer oper-
ating a single factory employing 400 men producing annually trailers
valued at $3,000,000 when it was established that 50 percent of his raw
materials and 80 percent of his finished products crossed state lines. A
slightly different approach was used in the Friedman-Harry Marks
case 28 involving a small clothing manufacturer who employed 800 per-
sons. In this case the Court placed special emphasis on statistics con-
cerning the entire clothing industry. Information regarding the geo-
graphical location of the factories, the source of materials and the
distribution of the finished product made it evident that the industry
was one whose functioning was completely dependent upon interstate
commerce. The history of labor relations in the industry revealed that
collective bargaining had brought peace to a large segment of the in-
dustry; congressionally fostered collective bargaining could help to bring
peace to other parts of the industry and thus free interstate commerce
from burdens and obstructions caused by industrial strife.
The Court had thus far spoken in broad generalities, but those who
were seeking to apply a mechanical test to determine the limits of the
Board's power were stopped short by the decision in the Santa Cruz
Fruit Packing Co. case. 29 Here the Court expressly negatived a mechan-
ical test in applying the Wagner Act to a packer of fruits and vegetables
" LRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1 (1937).
Id. at 41-42. i Id. at 32.
2 NLRB v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U. S. 49 (1937).
NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U. S. 58 (1937).
2' Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. NLRB, 303 U. S. 58 (1938).
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employing 1,200 persons and shipping 37 percent of his goods out of
state. The Court set at rest argument based on what is "direct" and
"indirect" and what is "remote," saying, "... the criterion is necessarily
one of degree and must be so defined." 30  An employer hiring from
60 to 200 workers who processed into clothing materials never owned
by the employer contended in the Fainblatt case 3l the size of his busi-
ness excluded him from the Board's jurisdiction. The Court again ex-
amined the clothing industry as a whole, noting that small establishments
predominated, averaging only about 32 employees each, yet the total
production of the industry was a significant part of the nation's business.
If small operators were not covered, the greater part of the industry
would escape regulation. The success of collective bargaining in the
clothing industry in some localities was strong support for extension
of coverage of the Wagner Act.
The Fainblatt decision advanced the de mninimis doctrine as a limita-
tion of the Board's jurisdiction.3 2  Under this theory the Board will
have no power to act when the volume of commerce affected is so small
it is regarded as de ininimis, but the decision made no explanation of
what volume would come within the maxim. In the Bradford Dyeing
Association case33 a processor of dyed goods sought exemption under
this doctrine since his production amounted to only one percent of the
national total. This argument was rejected; the ratio of his output to
that of the entire industry was held not controlling.
The basic thread running through the series of Supreme Court de-
cisions is that jurisdiction is based on a question of fact whether there
is such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce as to
justify federal intervention. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that
the industry as a whole will be viewed to determine whether disputes
between employer and employee in the particular instance are within
the power of Congress to regulate.34 The integrated character of the
national economy is basic in this approach. This principle will be use-
ful in any examination of an industry heretofore unregulated, such as
the building and construction industry.
Application of the economic approach in determining the Labor
Board's jurisdiction has not produced a clear test for determining that
jurisdiction, but the courts have carved out certain areas as coming
within the Board's authority. Decisions of the Supreme Court would
clearly justify the exercise of jurisdiction over almost all types of
manufacturing, mining and processing where raw materials or finished
20 Id. at 467.
31 NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U. S. 601 (1939).
11 Id. at 607. For further discussion of the de inininis doctrine as applied to
Labor Board cases, see hifra p. 28.33NLRB v. Bradford Dyeing Association, 310 U. S. 318 (1940). The em-
ployer hired an average of about 700 employees during the preceding year.
' Polish National Alliance v. NLRB. 322 U. S. 643. 648 (1944)
[Vol. 28
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products cross state lines. Lower federal courts have affirmed the exer-
cise of jurisdiction in other areas. Public utilities which supply services
to customers engaged in interstate commerce were found substantially
to. affect that commerce. 35  Insurance companies,8 6 banks, 37 auto dis-
tributors,38 retail lumber yards,3 9 local transportation systems,40 and cold
storage plants41 were found not to be immune from the Board's orders.
Building maintenance employees in an office building whose tenants are
engaged in interstate commerce are within the Act.4 2 A few interstate
connections made by a telephone exchange serving a small community
caused it to be subject to the Board's jurisdiction." A court affirmed
jurisdiction over a labor dispute in one of a chain of retail grocery
stores.44  The Board's assertions of jurisdiction have been strongly
contested by retail department stores, but Board decisions against
them have been enforced by the courts. 45  Smaller retail stores now
ponder the limits of the Board's authority in that field, especially
in the case of secondary boycotts and union shop elections. It is im-
portant for the storekeeper to know whether or not he can safely sign
a closed-shop contract with a union or discharge employees under a
union security agreement.
The only unreversed decision of a circuit court of appeals denying
the Board's jurisdiction is NLRB v. Idaho-Maryland Mines Corp.,
46
where it was held the Board had no jurisdiction over a corporation en-
gaged in gold mining which purchased from local dealers supplies orig-
" Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U. S. 197 (1938).
" Polish National Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U. S. 643 (1944) ; Phoenix Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 167 F. 2d 983 (7th Cir. 1948).
"' NLRB v. Bank of America, 130 F. 2d 624 (9th Cir. 1942), cert. denied,
318 U. S. 792 (1942).
" Williams Motor Co. v. NLRB, 128 F. 2d 960 (8th Cir. 1942).
" NLRB v. Suburban Lumber Co., 121 F. 2d 829 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied,
314 U. S. 693 (1941).
"o NLRB v. Baltimore Transit Co., 140 F. 2d 51 (4th Cir. 1944), cert. denied,
321 U. S. 795 (1944).
" NLRB v. Security Warehouse and Cold Storage Co., 136 F. 2d 829 (9th
Cir. 1943).
"Butler Bros. v. NLRB, 134 F. 2d 981 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320
U. S. 789 (1943). Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, compare Borden Co. v.
Borella, 325 U. 5. 679 (1945) (building maintenance employees covered by the
Act when 58 percent of the rentable space occupied by tenant engaged in inter-
state commerce) With 10 East 40th Street Building v. Callus, 325 U. S. 578
(1945) (building maintenance employees not covered by the Act when 48 percent
of rentable space occupied by tenants engaged in interstate commerce).
" NLRB v. J. G. Boswell Co., 136 F. 2d 585. (9th Cir. 1943). See also,
NLRB v. Central Telephone Co., 115 F. 2d 380 (6th Cir. 1940).
" NLRB v. Hill Stores, Inc., 140 F. 2d 924 (5th Cir. 1944). Cf. Hom-ond
Stores, 77 N. L. R. B. 647 (1948) (jurisdiction declined in a similar case).
"' NLRB v. J. L. Hudson Co., 135 F. 2d 380 (6th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320
U. S. 740 (1943); NLRB v. M. E. Blatt Co., 143 F. 2d 268 (3d Cir. 1944),
cert. denied, 323 U. S. 774 (1944); J. L. Brandeis & Sons v. NLRB, 142 F. 2d
977 (8th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U. S. 751 (1944).
"NLRB v. Idaho-Maryland Mines Corp., 98 F. 2d 129 (9th Cir. 1938). Cf.
Groneman & Groneman v. I. B. E. W., 17 CCH Lab. Cas. No. 65,410 (10th Cir.
1949) where the court denied recovery in a building contractor's suit against a
union on the grounds of de minimis.
1949]
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inating outside the state and whose product moved out of the state
after sale either to a local refinery or to the United States government.
Though the Board did not request certiorari, it apparently doubted the
correctness of the decision.4 7  In NLRB v. Sunshine Mining Co.48
the same court affirmed the Board's exercise of jurisdiction over a much
larger mining corporation operating in a similar manner, selling its
product to a local smelter. After years of interpretation, the courts
have produced no real standard for determining coverage of small
employers.
JURISDICTION AS CONCEIVED BY THE NLRB
In Board proceedings, movement of goods to or from the employer's
business enterprise across state lines is regarded as an ample basis for
jurisdiction and a mere statement of the value of these goods is usually
deemed sufficient to meet a challenge of the Board's jurisdiction. Using
the factual approach, the Labor Board has claimed for itself a wide
area of coverage. Jurisdiction over a neighborhood newspaper was
based on the fact that the newspaper published advertisements of nation-
ally known products sold in local branch stores of large chain organ-
izations and on the fact that the publisher's supplies were purchased and
shipped from outside the state.4 9 Jurisdiction over another local news-
paper was based on a small out-of-state circulation and out-of-state
purchases of supplies.8 0 A cafeteria serving interstate passengers at a
large airport was subject to the Board's authority.8 ' Other employers
subjected to Board orders include a non-profit trade school, 2 a de-
tective agency,- local utilities,54 a filling station and tire recapping
plant,15 a greenhouse, 56 an advertising service whose clients manufac-
tured goods for interstate commerce, 7 house-to-house carriers of
newspapers, 8 and a safe deposit company. 9 Recent significant develop-
' See, 4 NLRB Ann. Rep. 113 (1939).'8 NLRB v. Sunshine Mining Co., 110 F. 2d 780 (9th Cir. 1940), cert. denied,
312 U. S. 678 (1941). Cf. Canyon Corp. v. NLRB, 128 F. 2d 953 (8th Cir.
1942).
40 Southtown Economist, 72 N. L. R. B. 1393 (1947).
'Lebanon News Publishing Co., 37 N. L. R. B. 649 (1941) (about 300 of
17,500 subscribers were out of state).
" Air Terminal Services, Inc., 67 N. L. R. B. 702 (1946). Would a stoppage
of operations interfere with the flow of interstate commerce, or would it only
inconvenience the passengers?
"2Henry Ford Trade School, 58 N. L. R. B. 1535 (1944) (repairing and
manufacturing tools used in manufacture of interstate product).
" William J. Burns Detective Agency, 47 N. L. R. B. 610 (1943) (guards at
a manufacturing plant).
"' Indianapolis Water Co., 48 N. L. R. B. 1399 (1943).
" Lewis Tire Service Co., 62 N. L. R. B. 531 (1945).
" Bauske Bros., 38 N. L. R. B. 435 (1942).
Sterling Advertising Agency, 42 N. L. R. B. 281 (1942).
Pulitzer Publishing Co., 57 N. L. R. B. 1696 (1944).
' Bankers Safe Deposit Co., 56 N. L. R. B. 1071 (1944).
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ments include assertions of jurisdiction over the building and construc-
tion industry60 and retail auto dealers who have a franchise as a
distributor.61
The Labor Board's conception of the limits of its power is best
traced in the decisions refusing to assert jurisdiction. Even here there
is very little to guide one, for the Board has rarely denied its power
to act because of lack of jurisdiction under the power of Congress to
regulate and protect interstate commerce. Customarily the Board will
dismiss a proceeding on policy grounds, stating, "While we do not find
that the operations of the company are wholly unrelated to commerce,
in view of the essentially local character of the company's business, we
do not believe that the policies of the Act will be effectuated by assert-
ing jurisdiction in this case." 6 2  Consciously the Board has refused to
draw a line of its authority lest it be hampered when it finds a need for
exercise of its authority. to its fullest extent. Rarely has the Labor
Board boldly stated that it had no power over an employer. Singularly,
one of the rare cases disclaiming jurisdiction involved two construction
companies. In the Amerada Petroleum Corporation proceeding,6 3 the
Board found two construction companies engaged in construction and
maintenance of oil wells and equipment who purchased all or substan-
tially all their equipment locally, performed only a local maintenance
function and were "not engaged in activities which affect commerce
within the meaning of the Act."6' 4 The decision can be seriously doubted
for it would seem that construction and maintenance of oil wells and
equipment is necessary for the production of oil which moves in inter-
state commerce.
A survey of the cases in which the Board declined jurisdiction under
the Wagner Act reveals the uncertainty which faces employers and
unions. The decisions reveal no set pattern. For example, while assert-
ing jurisdiction over several dairies 5 and cooperatives, " the Board dis-
"0Ira A. Watson Co., 80 N. L. R. B. No. 91 (1948) ; United Brotherhood of
Carpenters and Joiners, 81 N. L. R. B. No. 127 (1949); Samuel Langer, 82
N. L. R. B. No. 132 (1,949); Denver Building Trades Council, 82 N. L. R. B.
No. 137 (1949).8 1Liddon White Truck Co., 76 N. L. R. B. 1181 (1948); Puritan Chevrolet
Co., 76 N. L. R. B. 1243 (1948); M. L. Townsend, 81 N. L. R. B. No. 122
(1949).
" McDonald Cooperative Dairy Co., 58 N. L. R. B. 552, 553 (1944). In
effect, this statement has been repeated in almost every case in which the Board
declined jurisdiction. The Board has also frequently stated, "Aside from the
issue as to whether the company is subject to the jurisdiction of the Board, we
are of the opinion that the effect of the company's operations on interstate com-
merce is so unsubstantial that to assert jurisdiction in this case would not
effectuate the policies of the Act.' S. & R. Baking Co., 65 N. L. R. B. 351
(1946).
" Amerida Petroleum Corporation, 60 N. L. R. B. 1467 (1945).
61 d. at 1469.
"West Side Cooperative Creamery Association, 69 N. L. R. B. 546 (1946);
Enid Cooperative Creamery Association, 58 N. L. R. B. 592 (1944).
"' Rockingham Poultry Market Cooperative, 59 N. L. R. B. 486 (1944).
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missed a complaint against a large cooperative dairy which had purchased
in one year $38,000 in goods from outside the state.67 The cooperative
had shipped 20,000 pounds of powdered milk to points outside the state
and had sold other products valued at $30,000 to agents of the federal
government. These transactions amounted to roughly two percent of the
company's business.
A petition involving a city bus company serving a limited part of
the city's population and no industrial areas was dismissed in the Chi-
cago Motor Coach case.6 8 One factor in the decision was the availability
of competing transportation several blocks away.6 9 The Board refused
to ground its jurisdiction on out-of-state purchases of motor fuel and
supplies amounting to half a million dollars annually because these pur-
chases were "incidental" to respondent's transportation business and if
'controlling" weight were given to out-of-state purchases "even the
smallest bus line or taxi company" would be subject to the Act unless
it is "located in one of the petroleum producing states." 70 This reason-
ing fails adequately to ecplain the result. Availability of services by
competitors was not important in the Bradford Dyeing case. A strike
on a system serving thousands daily would strain other transportation
systems operating in industrial areas. Respondent's competitors were
covered by the Act.71 Many decisions rest on out-of-state purchases of
supplies and the Board does not recognize the possibility of line draw-
ing to exclude small bus companies and taxis. One important implica-
tion of the case is that purchase of capital equipment is not as important
in determining jurisdiction as are purchases involving a regular and
continuous inflow of materials.
72
A complaint against a bus company operating between Los Angeles
and San Francisco was dismissed when it was shown that 83 persons
or a total of one and one-half percent of the total passengers were on
interstate journeys. 73 When no evidence was adduced showing a strike
in a cafeteria in an aircraft plant would burden or obstruct commerce,
a petition by workers in the cafeteria was dismissed.74 The Board re-
garded the cafeteria as a business "local in character and one over which
the Board does not customarily assert jurisdiction." The Board de-
17 McDonald Cooperative Dairy Co., 58 N. L. R. B. 552 (1944).
" Chicago Motor Coach Co., 62 N. L. R. B. 890 (1945). Cf. Duke Power Co.,
77 N. L. R. B. 652 (1948) (dismissing a petition involving bus company in a
small city) ; NLRB v. Baltimore Transit Co., 140 F. 2d 51 (4th Cir. 1943), cert.
denied, 321 U. C. 696 (1944) (affirmed jurisdiction over a bus company serving
an entire city where passengers are engaged in the production of goods that flow
in interstate commerce).
" Chicago Motor Coach Co., 62 N. L. R. B. 890, 893 (1945).
o Id. at 893, footnote 9.
7 Chicago Surface Lines, 58 N. L. R. B. 1140 (1944).
72 Cf. Richter Transfer Co., 80 N. L. R. B. No. 186 (1948).
'7Airline Bus Co., 64 N. L. R. B. 620 (1945).
7, Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corp., 57 N. L. R. B. 1680 (1944).
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clined jurisdiction over a bakery, though substantial out-of-state pur-
chases of raw materials were made, when it was shown that all or nearly
all of the respondent's customers were within the state. 5 The effect
of out-of-state purchases was regarded as "unsubstantial." The Board
declined jurisdiction over a company having three plants in California
manufacturing flour and feed from raw materials, "overwhelmingly"
originating within the state and selling all of its products for consump-
tion in the state.76 Employees of a casualty insurance company engaged
in insuring a city transportation system were denied an election in the
St. Louis Public Service Co. case.
77
These Labor Board decisions have almost all been decided under the
Wagner Act. As was previously noted,78 the Taft-Hartley Act made
no change in the provisions defining "commerce," but the enlarged sub-
ject matter regulated by the new act has resulted in a broader coverage.
It is also true that many more decisions under the Taft-Hartley Act
decline jurisdiction than was previously the case. In a recent twelve-
month the Board dismissed over forty cases which reached the decision
stage, each decision stating in effect that to assert jurisdiction would
not effectuate the policies of the Act. Probably the major reason for
this increase is the division of authority under the Taft-Hartley Act
whereby the Board members have nothing to do with determination of
policies for filing unfair labor practice complaints, whereas under the
Wagner Act the over-all policies for instituting such proceedings were
made by the Board. The General Counsel's opinion as to what will
"effectuate the policies of the Act" obviously differs greatly from that
of the members of the Board.79 There has also been strong difference
of opinion between Board members with reference to the desirability
of asserting jurisdiction.
Since Board decisions dismissing proceedings on jurisdictional
grounds have appeared in greater numbers under the Taft-Hartley Act
as the General Counsel has put into practice his policy of extending the
coverage of the Act to small businesses, the views of the Board on
jurisdiction are further revealed. However, the Board continues to
place dismissal on administrative discretion and not on a lack of power
" S. & R. Baking Co., 65 N. L. R. B. 351 (1946). Cf. NLRB v. McGough
Bakeries Corp., 153 F. 2d 420 (5th Cir. 1946) (jurisdiction over a bakery
affirmed). The cases are difficult to distinguish. See also, NLRB v. Schmidt
Baking Co., 122 F. 2d 162 (4th Cir. 1941); NLRB v. Van De Kamp's Holland-
Dutch Bakeries. 152 F. 2d 818 (9th Cir. 1946).
"0 Lacey Milling Co., 48 N. L. R. B. 914 (1943).
" St. Louis Public Service Co., 65 N. L. R. B. 775 (1946). Cf. Transit Cas-
ualty Co., 83 N. L. R. B. No. 128 (1949) in which the Board asserted jurisdic-
tion over the same company after it had expanded its operations over twelve
states.
" Supra p. 1.
" A-1 Photo Service, 83 N. L. R. B. No. 146 (1949).
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to act. To some extent the Board has set a pattern, still somewhat
uncertain, of operating on an industry basis, asserting jurisdiction in
some industries and declining jurisdiction in others. For example, juris-
diction has been declined in several bakery cases when there were no
substantial out-of-state shipments, though the out-of-state purchases of
materials may have been quite large.80 Laundries have generally
escaped regulation by the Board8l unless they operate in two states82
or have some closer than ordinary connection with interstate commerce,
such as supplying interstate carriers.11 Proceedings involving building
materials suppliers, such as suppliers of sand and gravel and ready-mix
cement, are frequently dismissed on policy grounds though the "inci-
dental'! purchases of equipment and supplies from dealers who obtained
them out of state may amount to large sums. 4 In general, the Labor
Board has refused to assert jurisdiction over dairies unless they have
some direct connection with interstate commerce.85 A few recent de-
cisions have dismissed proceedings involving small retail stores.8 6 The
retail store decisions are based on policy grounds and the proprietors
are still at sea as to whether they can consent to a union-shop contract
without an election supervised by the Labor Board.
Late decisions declining jurisdiction over several small manufactur-
ing plants s7 may presage a significant change in the attitude of the
Board or it may be that the Genral Counsel has brought complaints
against smaller businesses to the Board for decision. Uncertainty has
"o Fehr Baking Co., 79 N. L. R. B. No. 60 (1948) (raw materials valued at
$1,470,000 originated out of state) ; Golden Crust Bakery, 80 N. L. R. B. No. 117
(1948) (out of state purchases amounted to $288,000 in one year). See note 75
supra.
8Red Star Industrial Service, 80 N. L. R. B. No. 135 (1948); J. Arthur
Anderson Laundry, 83 N. L. R. B. No. 155 (1949).
82 NLRB v. White Swan Co., 118 F. 2d 1002 (1941).
8 New York Steam Laundry, 80 N. L. R. B. No. 242 (1948).
84 Tampa Sand & Material Co., 78 N. L. R. B. 629 (1948) ; Texas Construction
Material Co., 80 N. L. R. B. No. 187 (1948); Richter Transfer Co., 80 N. L. R. B.
No. 186 (1948) ; Hanwalt Bros., 80 N. L. R. B. No. 196 (1948) ; Knoxville San-
gravel Co., 80 N. L. R. B. No. 227 (1948); Miller Concrete Pipe Co., 83
N. L. R. B. No. 102 (1949). Cf. NLRB v. Suburban Lumber Co., 121 F. 2d 829
(3d Cir. 1941); cert. denied, 314 U. S. 693 (1941); J. H. Patterson Co., 79
N. L. R. B. No. 48 (1948) (cases exercising jurisdiction over lumber yards).
85 Purity Creamery Co., 79 N. L. R. B. No. 132 (1948); Creamland Dairies,
80 N. L. R. B. No. 21 (1948); Eugene Farmers Creamery, Case No. 36-RC-50,
October 12, 1948. Mr. Denham doubts the Board's power over a dairy producing
and selling milk locally. Hearings, supra. note 5 at 24.
88Sun Photo Co., 79 N. L. R. B. No. 174 (1948)I; Haleston Drug Stores, Inc.,
82 N. L. R. B. No. 148 (1949) (chain of four retail drug stores) ; A-i Photo
Service;, 83 N. L. R. B. No. 86 (1949); Bailey Slipper Shop, Inc., 84 N. L. R. B.
No. 41 (1949). Cf. King Brooks, Inc., 84 N. L. R. B. No. 74 (1949) retail cloth-
ing store purchasing goods valued at $400,000 out of state held subject to Act).
87 Screw Machine Products Co., 79 N. L. R. B. No. 47 (1948); Gabilan Iron
& Machine Co., 80 N. L. R. B. No. 127 (1948); Advance Welding Works, 81
N. L. R. B. No. 30 (1949); Clayton Dorris Co., 78 N. L. R. B. 859 (1948);
Warner Printing Co., 80 N. L. R. B. No. 33 (1948); Detroit Canvas Manufac-
turers Association, 80 N. L. R. B. No. 54 (1948).
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clouded the question of coverage of retail automobile dealers. After assert-
ing jurisdiction over a retail automobile dealer as late as 1941,88 the
Labor Board dismissed in 1947 a petition for certification involving a
dealer who obtained his cars from a local assembly plant.89 A year
later the Liddon White Truck Co. case * reversed the trend and held,
with a strong dissent by Chairman Herzog and Member Murdock, that
the Act applied to a dealer whose autos were shipped from out of
state. Liddon White and other recent decisions have made it plain that
jurisdiction will be exercised where the dealer has a franchise for
distribution of automobiles, even though the dealer purchases autos
manufactured in the state and his sales are local, 91 since this is the
terminus of interstate movement of most of the raw materials going
into the automobiles.
An examination of the size of the establishments involved in Board
orders further reveals the pattern of the Board's jurisdiction. In the
Fainblatt case the Supreme Court held an employer covered by the Act
who hired from sixty to two hundred workers and processed about one
thousand dozen women's garments a month; jurisdiction over the entire
clothing industry, down to the limits of the maxim de nzinirnis included
authority over this employer. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals held
an employer hiring eleven employees in a lumber yard and purchasing
outside the state materials valued at $150,000 subject to the Board's
jurisdiction.92 The Board asserted jurisdiction over an employer sell-
ing out of state one-half his locally purchased poultry products valued
at $25,000.93 Size of the establishments involved in Labor Board pro-
ceedings is disclosed in an NLRB summary showing that 37 percent
of the unfair labor practice cases and 55 percent of the representation
cases received by the Board during the fiscal year 1943 were in estab-
lishments employing less than 100 workers.
94
Cases establishing the Board's jurisdiction can be contrasted sharply
with other Board decisions dismissing petitions on jurisdictional or policy
grounds. A cooperative dairy purchased goods valued at $40,000 and
sold a large amount of goods outside the state, yet the Bbard dismissed
the complaint.95 Out-of-state purchases of gasoline and equipment in
" Newton Chevrolet Co., 27 N. L. R. B. 334 (1941).
" Herff Motor Co., 74 N. L. R. B. 1007 (1947).
" Liddon White Truck Co., 76 N. L. R. B. 1181 (1948).
" Puritan Chevrolet, Inc., 76 N. L. R. B. 1243 (1943); Adams Motors, Inc.,
80 N. L. R. B. No. 236 (1948); Johns Bros., 84 N. L. R. B. No. 33 (1949)
(Michigan dealer who sold cars manufactured intrastate). Cf. Bangor Auto Body
Shop., 82 N. L. R. B. No. 76 (1949) (employer engaged in repair of vehicles
and sale of auto parts vho had no exclusive agency or franchise escaped
regulation).
" NLRB v. Suburban Lumber Co., 121 F. 2d 829 (3d Cir. 1941).
"Fairmont Creamery Co., 73 N. L. R. B. 792 (1947).
"8 NLRB Ann. Rep. 90 (1943).
"McDonald Dairy Co., 58 N. L. R. B. 552 (1944).
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the Chicago Motor Coach case amounting to $500,000 were only "inci-
dental" to its business of transportation and jurisdiction was declined. 0
In the Fehr Baking Co. case97 raw materials valued at $1,470,000 orig-
inated out of state, yet the Board refused to act. The Board apparently
believed it had reached or was nearing the limit of its authority when
it dismissed a petition in the Southwest Metals case98 declining to assert
its authority over a small mine employing five men who produced an-
nually ore valued at $7,000.
This case survey discloses that the pattern of coverage is quite clear
for a large area of the nation's industry. It also reveals that the ques-
tion of coverage is quite unclear in the area of small employers, for
example, those who employ from one to one hundred employees and
whose interstate business amounts to less than $100,000 annually. The
dilemma of the employer and employee in this area is illustrated by the
checkered experience of the retail automobile dealers. 90 This dilemma
is further heightened by the statements of Mr. Denham that he can
"9conceive very few businesses over which there is not at least technical
jurisdiction."'100 One witness before a congressional subcommittee who
had discussed the matter with Mr. Denham understood Mr. Denham's
view to be that jurisdiction over a small tavern with two bartenders,
selling locally produced beer, could be based on the fact that the hops
used in brewing the beer were brought in from another state. 10 1 At
the same investigation Mr. Denham stated that he was compelled by
the statute to set the forces of government in action if interstate move-
ment of more than a few dollars was involved, 02 but his testimony in
full before the subcommittee reveals that Mr. Denham is as much at sea
as the rest of us. This hearing also brought out the plight of the em-
ployees in the hotel industry. Under the Wagner Act they sought aid
from the Labor Board, but their pleas were rejected. Now that the
heavy hand of government regulation falls on unions under the Taft-
Hartley Act, the General Counsel proposes to apply the Act in this
industry. Also revealed at the hearing was the fact that both employers
and employees in the hotel industry were desirous of retaining their
former immunity.
Uncertain as it is, the most dependable guide of the exercise of
" Chicago Motor Coach Co., 62 N. L. R. B. 890 (1945).
"7Fehr Baking Co., 79 N. L. R. B. No. 60 (1948).oSouthwest Metals, 72 N. L. R. B. 58 (1947).
"Supra, p. 13.
"' Hearings before Subcommittees of the Committee on Education and Labor
and of the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, Investigation
to Ascertain Scope of Interpretation by General Counsel of National Labor Rela-
tions Board of the Term "Affecting Commerce," as Used in the Labor Manage-
inent Relations Act, 1947, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. 18 (1948).
1G1 Id. at 3.
202 Id. at 18.
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jurisdiction by the Labor Board is that of industry-wide coverage,
though even here many of the little fellows are screened out before the
Board takes formal action. Another factor is the direction of move-
ment of goods in interstate commerce. Though it is difficult to cite any
particular decisions to support the statement, after reading many cases
one has the feeling that the Board has placed greater emphasis on pro-
duction for out-of-state shipment than on production for local con-
sumption from materials originating in other states.
The case survey also reveals the sweeping authority the Board has
exercised over local enterprises. The cases establish that no mechanical
test is controlling, but at least some mechanical factors, such as size and
volume of commerce affected, are weighed in determining whether or
not a stoppage of the employer's operations by industrial strife would
substantially interfere with the flow of interstate commerce. Questions
of degree do not lend themselves to ready solution; the limits of this
authority remain to be picked out from case to case. Thus far the
decisions have only extended the concept of the Board's jurisdiction;
the bounds of its power remain to be delineated.
THEORIES ON WHICH JURISDICTION MAY BE BASED
One can have little patience with the argument occasionally ad-
vanced that the building and construction industry as such is not cov-
ered by the Labor Relations Act.10 3 It is sufficient to point to several
well-known construction companies who operate in several states, carry-
ing on" an interstate business. Each project in a single state cannot be
considered alone when a dispute arises with a large construction com-
pany. The projects often complement one another; workers are shifted
as needed and plans usually move from a central office which directs
work in certain regions. A labor dispute at one job might spread to
the contractor's other projects. These facts would be enough to sustain
jurisdiction.
Generally accepted theories of jurisdiction will warrant an exercise
of power over much of the building and construction industry. The
real problem is whether or not all the industry is covered, and if it is
not covered where shall the line be drawn. There is no simple line
drawing process except to set some arbitrary figure for the amount of
interstate commerce handled by the firm involved, but the chance of
establishing such a limit, other than by legislation, is not great. How-
ever, the delineation of the limits by the case-to-case method will permit
the courts to hold that regulation of labor relations in some small con-
struction projects, .such as building a single small residence, is beyond
the power of Congress. If such an area of exemption exists, it is the
I"' Brown & Root, 77 N. L. R. B. 1136 (1948).
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belief of the author that the touchstone as to whether or not interstate
commerce would be affected by a labor dispute within the meaning of
the Act depends upon whether or not the labor dispute would spread
from the immediate employer-employee relationship and engulf an even
larger area of the industry. The discussion of the limitation will be on
this basis.
A. CONSTRUCTION FOR INTERSTATE COMMERCE
It is not difficult to establish jurisdiction of the Labor Board over
labor disputes when the construction may be said to be "in commerce."
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act 10 4 employees engaged in construc-
tion on interstate instrumentalities, such as railroads, highways, bridges,
streets, navigable waterways and telephone companies, have been found
to be "in commerce" and subject to the power of Congress to regulate
wages.'0 5 It seems certain that they would be covered by the broader
NLRA. Labor disputes in construction "for interstate commerce," such
as original construction of highways, railroads, airports and related con-
struction, would appear to fall within the broad category, "affecting
commerce." Construction of new plants for the production of goods
for interstate commerce and construction of new units in existing plants
producing goods for interstate commerce could be covered on the theory
that plant construction is requisite for subsequent production. Some
construction companies would be subject to the Act on the ground they
are "engaged in commerce." This could involve the actual shipment of
goods across state lines or it might be the shipment of plans, specifica-
tions and other materials from a central office to construction projects
located in several states.'00
Chairman Herzog in a concurring opinion in the Samuel Langer
case, 10 7 in which the Board exercised jurisdiction over a dispute con-
cerning construction of a residence, thought the proper basis for juris-
diction over the dispute was the fact that the New York subcontractor
was operating in New Jersey, making it an interstate transaction. This
" 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), 29 U. S. C. A. 201 et seq. (1947).... Fitzgerald v. Pederson, 324 U. S. 720 (1944) (repairing railroad bridges)
Overstreet v. North Shore, 318 U. S. 125 (1943) (repairing highway bridge);
Walling v. McCrady Construction Co., 156 F. 2d 923 (3d Cir. 1946), cert. denied,
329 U. S. 635 (1946) (construction of roads, streets, bridges, telephone and rail-
way facilities) ; Walling v. Patton Tulley Transportation Co., 134 F. 2d 945 (6th
Cir. 1943) (construction of dikes and revetments on navigable waterway), The
requirement of the FLSA that the employee be engaged "in commerce or in the
production of goods for commerce," 29 U. S. C. A. §206(a) (1947). seriously
limits coverage of the Act. See, Higgins v. Carr Brothers, 317 U. S. 572 (1943).
Courts have refused to apply the Act to new construction of highways or indus-
trial plants. Shannon v. Bob Bros. Construction Co., 8 So. 2d 542 (La. Ct. App.
1943); Kelly v. Ford, Bacon & Davis, 162 F. 2d 555 (3d Cir. 1947) ; Noonan v.
Frisco Const. Co., 140 F. 2d 663 (8th Cir. 1943) ; Scholl v. McWilliams Dredging
Co., 169 F. 2d 729 (2d Cir. 1948). Note, 60 HARv. L. REV. 154 (1946).
100 NLRB v. Austin Co., 165 F. 2d 592 (7th Cir. 1947).
10? Samuel Langer, 82 N. L. R. B. No. 132 (1949).
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basis for jurisdiction could apply in a good many situations especially
where contractors are located near state lines and would normally operate
in several states, even though the individual contract or construction
project is quite small.
The same theory applied in the extreme case would justify an exer-
cise of jurisdiction over an mployer who moved any materials across
state lines to a construction project, such as a contractor who himself
made use of the channels of interstate commerce as distinguished from
an employer who purchased his materials locally and had no connection
with interstate movement. The analogy found in the FLSA cases may
support this conclusion for that Act has been held applicable in the
case of an employer who shipped in interstate commerce an almost
minute quantity of goods.10 8 The FLSA cases were situations where
the goods were exported and it may be that less weight will be given to
situations where the goods are imported for local consumption.
Jurisdiction based on construction for commerce, construction for
instrumentalities of commerce and engaging in interstate commerce
would cover the major portion of the building and construction indus-
try, but it would also leave a large area of local construction untouched,
such as the building of homes, schools and churches, when the goods
were purchased by the contractor locally.
B. MASTER CONTRACTS AND MEMBERSHIP IN COUNCILS
AND ASSOCIATIONS
More than any other industry the building and construction industry
has developed pyramiding organizations to deal with labor relations.
Contractors have formed local, state and national organizations, a part
of whose function is to aid the employers with their labor problems.
Unions are organized in much the same fashion. Locals in various
trades have organiezd councils which may have jurisdiction over a
municipal area or over several counties. State oganizations have been
formed, and the nineteen building trades unions in the American Fed-
eration of Labor have formed the Building Trades Department which
has considerable authority over the unions throughout the nation. It
is well known that one of the chief functions of the councils and the
Building Trades Department is to handle jurisdictional disputes. It is
also very common to have master contracts between employer asso-
ciations and the unions or councils. The master contract may cover a
city or the entire nation.'0 9
.0. Mabee et al. v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U. S. 178 (1946).
10. The bricklayers have a national agreement with the tile and the terrazzo
contractors' associations. In the New York area the nineteen building trades unions
have a master contract with all the contractors' associations. Frequently contractors
who are not members of associations sign agreements identical with the master
contracts.
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When it appears that the particular labor dispute in a local situation
will spread to other employers and their employees because it involves
a master contract or because of the relationship within an organization,
a very small employer and his employees might be covered who would
not otherwise be subject to the Act. Here again it would be important
to examine the facts to determine the likelihood that the dispute will
spread, causing a substantial effect on interstate commerce. One can
easily imagine a strike stopping construction in an entire city from a
dispute over a master contract. A general strike in the clothing industry
helped convince the Supreme Court of the necessity for coverage of
the entire industry.110
In Bott v. Glauier's Union Local No. 27111 attempts of a union to
enforce a by-law that all glazing must be done on the job caused a
city wide dispute with a contractor's association. When a local building
trades council made demands on a contractors' association for a union-
shop contract without a union-shop election as required by the Taft-
Hartley Act, the resulting labor dispute was broad enough to warrant
an exercise of jurisdiction.'1 2 In other situations the labor dispute
might involve a secondary boycott, a sympathetic strike or any other
joint action on the part of either associated unions or associated con-
tractors which would substantially interfere with interstate commerce.
Due to the extensive organization of the industry, jurisdiction on this
theory would cover a major portion of the industry and a very small
construction job would be covered when there is a strong possibility
the dispute will spread.
C. INDUSTRY-WIDE COVERAGE TO EFFECTUATE THE PoLIcIES
OF THE ACT
The declaration of policy expressed by Congress in Section I of
the National Labor Relations Act 13 implies a broad coverage of the
remedial portion of the Act. Congress expressed concern over labor
disputes which obstruct interstate commerce and tend to aggravate busi-
ness depressions by depressing wage rates. Congress also gave utter-
ance to solicitude over disputs arising out of differences of wages, hours,
or other working conditions. Execution of this broad policy would re-
quire national coverage to provide uniformity and to assure equality of
bargaining power between the employer and employees, and equality
of bargaining power between employees in the various industries which
might have a broad effect upon the national economy.
11oNLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U. S. 58, 74 (1937).
111Bott v. Glazier's Union Local No. 27, 15 CCH Lab. Cas. No. 64,859 (N. D.
Ill. 1948).
... California Association of Employers v. Building and Construction Trades
Council of Reno, 15 CCH Lab. Cas. No. 64,570 (D. Nev. 1948).
11861 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U. S. C. A. 151 (Supp. 1948).
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No decision has based jurisdiction on the full import of this argu-
ment, but the theory in a slightly different aspect has been used a num-
ber of times as a basis for asserting jurisdiction over small concerns.
Coverage here invariably has been based on the argument -that relatively
small employers must be covered or else the major portion of the in-
dustry will escape regulation, and this approach was accepted by the
Supreme Court in the clothing industry cases.1 1 4  Experience in the
clothing industry evidenced that costly industrial strife had been mate-
rially diminished by the use of collective agreements. A general strike
in New York had affected thousands of employees employed by hun-
dreds of small manufacturers. Evidence showed that clothing manufac-
turers employed an average of only about thirty-two employees each.
These facts were sufficient to convince the Court that effectuation of
the policies of the Act would require coverage of small local producers.
The smaller of the two clothing concerns to appear before the Court
was in the Fainblatt case where from sixty to two hundred employees
were involved. Employers and employees in even smaller concerns could
still question jurisdiction. However, the clothing industry is particularly
dependent on interstate commerce and almost complete coverage is
indicated by the decisions.
The same idea was expressed in the Polish National Alliance case
when Mr. Justice Frankfurter declared:
Whether or no practices may be deemed by Congress to affect inter-
state commerce is not to be determined by confining judgment to the
quantitative effect of the activities immediately before the Board.
Appropriate for judgment is the fact that the immediate situation is
representative of many others throughout the country, the total incidence
of which if left unchecked may well become far reaching in its harm to
commerce."t5
In the Mandeville Island Farms case, involving prosecution of a group
of processorp of sugar beets who were charged with violation of the
Sherman Act, Mr. Justice Rutledge stated in much the same terms:
Congress' power to keep the interstate market free of goods produced
under conditions inimical to the general welfare, United States v. Darby,
312 U. S. 100, 115, may be exercised in individual cases without show-
ing any specific effect upon interstate commerce, United States v. Walsh,
331 U. S. 432, 437-438; it is enough that the individual activity when
multiplied into a general practice is subject to federal control, Wickard
v. Filburn, or that it contains a threat to the interstate economy that
requires preventive regulation. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Labor
Board, 305 U. S. 197, 221-222.116
I'lNLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U. S. 58 (1937);
NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U. S. 601 (1939).
. Polish National Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U. S. 643, 648 (1944).
"' 0Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219,
236 (1948).
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The decisions have also relied heavily on Wickard v. Filburn
117
where the commerce power was found to support application of the
penalty provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 to that
part of a farmer's wheat crop grown for consumption, involving 239
bushels of wheat and a $117 penalty. The reasoning advanced was that
local production and consumption must be regulated because it is a
material factor in the national grain market.
It is submitted that Wickard v. Filburn is not authority for extending
jurisdiction of the Labor Board to situations in the building and con-
struction industry involving only a few hundred dollars. It is believed
a labor dispute in the building industry will have quite a different and
less far reaching effect on interstate commerce than that found in the
case of the production of wheat for local consumption. Surplus wheat
grown on a farm for local consumption remains a potential source of
supply for the interstate markets if the price is high enough to draw it
into commerce; it is the most variable factor in the source of supply
for the wheat market. For this reason it was essential that this poten-
tial market supply be regulated, else the whole regulatory process of the
statute would fail to accomplish its purpose. If the market price is
high, the practice of selling wheat grown for home consumption is wide-
spread. A work stoppage on a small construction project can be ex-
amined in the same light and unless it is found that the labor dispute
might spread to other jobs and thus have a substantial effect on com-
merce, the single project should be considered alone. The analysis of
both situations rests on the likelihood that the practice will spread. In
building projects, this likelihood would vary greatly from case to case.
The criterion is the same; what is the potential effect of this situation
on interstate commerce.
Briefs in construction cases submitted by the General Counsel's
office have invariably based their principal argument on this theory and
the courts and the Labor Board have generally accepted the argument
as a basis for application of the Taft-Hartley Act.118 However, a court
1"Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111 (1942).
"-SUnited Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Sperry, 170 F. 2d 863 (10th Cir.
1948) employees of contractors induced to strike when contractor erected pre-
fabricated houses produced by non-union manufacturer); Shore v. Building &
Construction Trades Council, 173 F. 2d 678 (3d Cir. 1949) (A subcontract for
electrical work on a job of constructing an $80,000 open air theater was awarded
to a non-union contractor. The council caused union men employed by the general
contractor and other subcontractors to walk off the job. The general contractor
did a gross business of $460,000 and purchased $250,000 worth of equipment an-
nually, most of it coming from local dealers. The subcontractor did a gross
business of $30,000 annually and purchased locally supplies valued at $15,000) ;
Slater v. Denver Building and Construtcion Trades Council, - F 2d -, 16
CCH Lab. Cas. No. 65,237 (10th Cir. 1949), reversing 81 F. Supp. 490 (D. Colo.
1948) (Injunction issued against a council which placed a manufacturer of soda
fountains, who imported and exported over $100,000 worth of goods, on an unfair
list and called strikes on projects where his employees installed fountains).
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issuing an injunction against a union or concern involving a small' job
may find itself in an anomalous position if the Labor Board later exer-
cises its administrative discretion and dismisses a complaint on the
ground that an assertion of jurisdiction would not effectuate the policies
of the Act. This situation occurred recently when a proceeding before
the Board was dismissed after the Third Circuit Court of Appeals had
affirmed a district court decision issuing an injunction.119 This situation
will probably not arise again if Mr. Denham succeeds in establishing his
argument that the Board cannot exercise administrative discretion in
secondary boycott cases,' 20 for the General Counsel would guide both
phases of the proceeding.
Jurisdiction based on industry-wide coverage would blanket the en-
tire country. A labor dispute on a construction job of minor impor-
tance would be typical of hundreds of other situations which taken
together would have a far-flung effect. To hold the Board powerless
over small contractors would leave a major part of the industry un-
regulated and the policies and practices in the industry non-uniform.
Evidence will show that it is a huge industry made up largely of small
concerns using large quantities of materials which have moved in inter-
state commerce. 121 Workers in other industries affected by labor dis-
putes in the construction industry include those in transportation,
lumber mills, stone quarries, cement factories, glass factories, steel mills
and many others. A total cessation of operations in the building indus-
try would see the economy of our country seriously dislocated. It is
on this ground Mr. Denham would blanket the entire industry.
D. VOLUME OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE
The great majority of decisions affirming the jurisdiction of the
National Labor Relations Board have been based on the volume of com-
merce moving across state lines to or from the concern involved. This
11I Shore v. Building & Construction Trades Council, 15 CCH Lab. Cas. No.
64,837 (W. D. Pa. 1948), affirmed, 173 F. 2d 678 (3d Cir. 1949); Petredis and
Fryer, 85 N. L. R. B. No. 45 (1949). On the other hand, the Board has asserted
jurisdiction when a court found the parties were not within the coverage of the
Act. Sperry v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 77 F. Supp. 321
(D. Colo. 1948); Gould & Preisner, 82 N. L. R. B. No. 137 (1949).
0 See note 11 supra.
'x In 1946 construction amounted to over ten billion dollars. In that year
thirteen states accounted for approximately 64 percent of lumber production and
accounted for only 26 percent of new construction activity. On the other hand,
states which accounted for approximately 74 percent of new construction accounted
for 36 percent of lumber production. U. S. Dept. of Commerce, CONSTRUCTION
AND CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS, DOLLAR CONSTRUCTION ESTIMATES, 1915-1946, pp.
36-42; CONSTRUCTION AND CONSRTUCTION MATERIALS, CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS,
1915-1946, pp. 37, 43-45. In 1939, the latest year for which statistics are available,
53 percent of the contractors did an annual business of less than $5,000 for each
establishment. In the same year over 20 percent of the construction was done by
contractors each doing less than $50,000 worth of business annually. U. S. Dept.
of Commerce, SIXTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1940, Vol. IV, p. 17.
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basis of jurisdiction has become so clear that decisions of both the
courts and the Labor Board regard it as sufficient in most cases to
establish jurisdiction by merely stating the value of goods moving across
state lines which would be affected by a work stoppage in the particular
situation.
The Supreme Court has said the limit of the Board's jurisdiction
based on the volume of interstate commerce is governed by the maxim
de minitnis,"2 but the court has offered no standard by which to apply
the rule. Whether or not the common law rule of "a few dollars or
less" applies to this type of case remains for a case denying jurisdiction
on this ground;123 there remains ample breadth of decision to exempt
many employers and unions from application of the Act by reason of
the small volume of commerce affected.
Several federal district courts have issued injunctions in building
and construction cases when they found the volume of commerce affected
was large enough to justify application of the Act. In Barker v. Local
1796, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners,12 the strike in-
volved alterations of a retail store, but the fact that it was one of a
small chain of stores could have caused the dispute to have spread to
other localities. California Association of Employers v. Building and
Construction Trades Council of Reno'2 5 involved all union projects in
the Reno area. Out-of-state purchases of materials for local construc-
tion valued at over $100,000 were sufficient to warrant jurisdiction in
Cranefield v. Bricklayers Union.2 6 Unions were enjoined from com-
mitting unfair labor practices in LeBaron v. Los Angeles Building and
Construction Trades Council in connection with construction of a
$38,000,000 power plant.12 7 A court found it had jurisdiction in a case
involving a contractor, employing about twenty persons, whose gross
annual receipts wert $100,000 though he purchased only $25,000 worth
of materials out of state.128 Jurisdiction is doubtful here unless it could
be shown the dispute might spread to other projects. Two unreversed
cases have denied jurisdiction over the union or employer involved.
Judge Symes of the Colorado District Court found he had no juris-
diction over a union in a case in which over $45,000 worth of materials
12 NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U. S. 601, 607 (1939).
123NLRB v. Suburban Lumber Co., 121 F. 2d 829 (3d Cir. 1941) (common
law rule of de minimis applied in a case affirming jurisdiction).
134 Barker v. Local 1796, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, 14
CCH Lab. Cas. No. 64,333 (M. D. Ala. 1948).
1' California Association of Employers v. Building and Construction Trades
Council of Reno, 15 CCH Lab. Cas. No. 64,570 (D. Nev. 1948).
128 Cranefield v. Bricklayers Union, 15 CCH Lab. Cas. No. 64,603 (W. D
Mich. 1948).
""LeBaron v. Los Angeles Building and Construction Trades Council, 84
F. Supp. 629 (S. D. Cal. 1949).
128 Sperry v. Building & Construction Trades Council of Kansas City, 15
CCH Lab. Cas. No. 64,836 (D. Kans. 1948).
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originated out of state and sales and services out of state amounted to
$7,000.129 The decision may have little weight since it was based on
the "coming to rest" doctrine of the Schechter case' 80 which is now
somewhat discounted. The case of Mills v. Plumbers Union,1al deny-
ing jurisdiction over installation of air conditioning equipment in a
bottling plant in a small town in Missouri, carries very little authority
since it was based on decisions under the Fair Labor Standards Act
and the court failed to take into account the limited coverage of that
Act. 32
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed jurisdiction over a
dispute involving a manufacturer of prefabricAted dwellings whose ship-
ments into and out of the state were over $150,000.'u When an injunc-
tion was issued in a case involving construction of an $80,000 open air
theater, the decision was affirmed on appeal 34 though the case may be
difficult to justify unless it could be shown the dispute would spread to
other contracts held by the various subcontractors working on the same
project. An employer who manufactured and installed soda fountains
was protected from union unfair labor practices when the evidence
showed he transported in interstate commerce materials valued in excess
of $150,000.135 Installations were made in several states. Installation
by non-union men would likely cause work stoppages of other con-
tractors on numerous jobs where the installations were being accom-
plished. Of the two cases in which Judge Symes denied jurisdiction, the
General Counsel appealed the Slater case 386 involving interstate com-
merce valued at $150,000 and did not appeal the Sperry case 3  where
the interstate business amounted to only $57,000. These figures may
have some significance in judging the volume thought necessary to sus-
tain an appeal, though other factors may have influenced the decision
not to carry the latter to the appellate court.
Since the decision was made to exercise jurisdiction over labor dis-
putes in the building and construction industry, several disputes at
large construction projects have been the subject of Board action.' 3 8
"I Sperry v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 77 F. Supp. 321.
(D. Colo. 1948). And see Groneman & Groneman v. I. B. E. W., 17 CCH Lab.
Cas. No. 65,410 (10th Cir. 1949).
" A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935).
... Mills v. Plumbers Union, 83 F. Supp. 240 (W. D. Mo. 1949).
13. See Note 105 supra.
""3 United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Sperry, 170 F. 2d 863 (10th Cir.
1948).... Shore v. Building and Construction Trades Council, 173 F. 2d 678 (3d Cir.
1949).
... Slater v. Denver Building and Construction Trades Council, - F. 2d -,
16 CCII Lab. Cas. No. 65,237 (10th Cir. 1949).
... Slater v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 81 F. Supp. 490
(D. Colo. 1948).
1, Sperry v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 77 F. Supp.
321 (D. Colo. 1948).
"I Brown & Root, 77 N. L. R. B. 1136 (1948) ; Guy F. Atldnson, 84 N. L. R. B.
No. 12 (.1949).
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'In two important cases the Board asserted jurisdiction over relatively
small projects. In the Ira A. Watson case' 39 the alleged unfair labor
practice occurred when a supplier of wall and floor coverings in re-
modeling a home used non-union workmen, causing employees of other
contractors to walk off the job. Though this job was a small one, the
supplier had a chain of stores in seven states. The Board was justified
in considering his entire volume for the dispute might have spread to
other stores and other jobs. In the Samuel Langer case 40 the sub-
contractor against whom the alleged unfair labor practice was leveled
did an annual business of $24,000 and purchased $5,000 worth of mate-
rials from points outside the state. The immediate union ban was aimed
at his $325 subcontract on a $15,000 residence construction project.
Jurisdiction can more easily be based on the fact that the subcontractor
was operating in two states or on the possibility that the dispute would
spread to other projects.
Dismissal of two proceedings involving disputes in the building and
construction industry was based on administrative discretion. A com-
plaint against an employer in the Walter J. Mentzer case," 4 alleging
the discharge of an employee was an unfair labor practice, was dis-
missed because of the small volume of the employer's business. He was
a small plastering contractor who employed from two to six men, had
a gross annual income of $33,000, and who purchased locally materials
valued at $11,000, some of which had originated outside the state. The
case seems correct. No particular project was involved which might
cause the dispute to spread and the dispute was between a non-union
worker and an employer. Though the non-union worker should not be
discriminated against, the fact that he does not have fellow union mem-
bers to come to his support lessens the possibility of a wide-spread dis-
pute. It is said that the General Counsel's Office suspects the real basis
for the decision is the de minimis rule, but the Board does not wish to
limit itself by placing the decision on that ground. The small volume
of interstate commerce resulting from construction of an $80,000 drive-in
theater caused the Labor Board to dismiss a complaint alleging a second-
ary boycott against a subcontractor in the Petredis and Fryer case.
1 42
Practically all the materials were purchased locally. The same facts
might have justified an exercise of jurisdiction on the possibility the
dispute would spread, since a general contractor and several subcon-
tractors were affected by the dispute.
Ira A. Watson,'80 N. L. R. B. No. 91 (1948).
" Samuel Langer, 82 N. L. R. B. No. 132 (1949).
"'Walter J. Mentzer,8 N. L. R. B. No. 39 (1949).
"'Petredis and Fryer, 85 N. L. R. B. No. 45 (1949). Cf. Shore v. Building
& Construction Trades Council, 173 F. 2d 678 (3d Cir. 1949) issuing an injunction
under the same facts.
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To determine the volume of commerce affected by a labor dispute
within the meaning of the Taft-Hartley Act, consideration must be given
to the "corhiing to rest doctrine" for small contractors customarily pur-
chase all their supplies from local dealers who have obtained them in
other states. One must remove the shadow of the Schechter case,1
4
3
which held that interstate commerce had ended when the product came
to rest after crossing state lines, and Congress had no power to regulate
wages and hours of those who handled the goods after that time. If the
Court's decision on this point has any life, it may rise to negate juris-
diction of the Labor Board over some employers and unions in the
building and construction industry.
The "coming to rest" doctrine was raised as a defense in the J. L.
Brandeis & Sons and in the M. E. Blatt cases,1 44 both involving retail
department stores where the employer contended his substantial out-of-
state purchases came to rest in the store or warehouse. The Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned:
If when selling at the store stops purchasing outside the state also stops,
it is fair to say that the latter is the effect of the former. . . . In de-
termining its own jurisdiction the Board properly considered the possible
effect of labor strife in the store upon the flow of merchandise purchased
and shipped from outside the state to maintain the constantly diminish-
ing stock offered for retail.1
45
Without mentioning the Schechter case, both decisions rejected the
"coming to rest" doctrine. The construction industry presents a closer
case than that involved in the retail store, for construction materials will
come to rest in a lumber yard and then move to a construction site
after a change of ownership. However, the same reasoning is applicable.
The flow of materials in interstate commerce to the warehouses of the
materials suppliers depends upon the consumption of materials in the
construction industry, though the effect may not be as immediate as in
the case of a dispute which stops production of goods intended for
interstate shipment.
The Schechter case has not been expressly overruled, but there are
many decisions inconsistent with the "coming to rest" doctrine. The
doctrine has been considerably weakened by the case of Wickard v.
Filburn46 for there no movement across state lines was involved in
growing grain for consumption on the farm where it was grown. If
the power of Congress extends over such local production and con-
143 A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp, v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935).
'J. L. Brandeis & Sons v. NLRB, 142 F. 2d 977 (8th Cir. 1944), cert.
denied, 323 U. S. 751 (1944); NLRB v. M. E. Blatt Co., 143 F. 2d 268 (3d Cir.
1944?, cert denied, 323 U. S. 774 (1944).
J. L. Brandeis & Sons v. NLRB, supra note 144 at p. 981.
"8 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111 (1942).
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sumption, certainly the fact that goods after having moved in interstate
commerce are stored for a time in a warehouse awaiting a purchaser
should not terminate the power of Congress. The Mandeville Island
Farms case 47 also lends support to this view. In that case price fixing
of sugar beets by processors who purchased from farmers was held a
violation of the Sherman Act though the beets came to rest at a proc-
essing plant after the purchase and were changed into a different form
before being shipped in interstate commerce. The "coming to rest"
doctrine has received some recognition in a Fair Labor Standards Act
case holding employees of a wholesaler were not covered by the Act
when goods were purchased by customers for shipment from a local
warehouse. 148 However, the holding is based on the limited statutory
coverage and is not a measure of the power of Congress.
Several avenues are available for disposing of the Schechter case.
It could be limited to its precise facts, the regulation of hours and
wages, and not apply the doctrine to a statute regulating unfair labor
practices, representation procedure, secondary boycotts and jurisdictional
disputes. But there is no reasonable distinction on this basis. The
case could be flatly overruled. This is unlikely to occur since previous
cases have ignored the doctrine when it could have been overruled.
That part of the decision in the Schechter case based on the commerce
clause was unnecessary; the strongest ground for the decision was on
the unconstitutional delegation of power. By considering the court's
statement on the commerce power as dictum, a case requiring a square
decision on the point could make short work of the prior pronouncement.
In any event, it is doubtful if the courts will apply the "coming to rest"
doctrine to limit the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board.
HISTORY OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE BUILDING TRADES
Appropriate for consideration is the history of industrial strife in
the building and construction industry. Chief Justice Hughes has stated
that, "Interstate commerce itself is a practical conception . . : (and)
interference with that commerce must be appraised by judgment that
does not ignore actual experience."' 4 9  Mr. Justice Frankfurter ex-
pressed much the same idea in the Polish National Alliance case when
he said, "When the conduct of an enterprise affects commerce among
the states is a matter of practical judgment not to be determined by
abstract notions. The exercise of this practical judgment the Constitu-
tion entrusted primarily and very largely to the Congress, subject to
the latter's control by the electorate." 15
14T Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219
(1948).
"' Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U. S. 564 (1943). See also, Hig-
gins v. Carr Brothers Co., 317 U. S. 572 (1943).
I'l NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U. S. 1, 41-42 (1937).2 Polish National Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U. S. 643, 650 (1944).
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Collective bargaining is wide-spread and serves a useful purpose in
the building and construction industry; it should be continued and pro-
tected. Though the industry is already highly organized, certain areas
are in need of protection. Failure of the Board to exercise jurisdiction
over the industry before 1947 does not establish that no protection is
needed. Furthermore, the Taft-Hartley Act enters a new field of regu-
lation when it covers jurisdictional disputes and secondary boycotts,
disputes which are peculiarly prevalent in the building trades, and the
new regulations have special significance for the industry. A factual
examination of industrial relations in the building trades under the
Taft-Hartley Act would also be useful in exercising this "practical
judgment," but such a survey is beyond the realm of this paper. This
experience gives added weight to argument for regulation of labor dis-
putes in an industry so dependent upon movement of goods in interstate
commerce.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT
Several NLRB decisions have made use of the legislative history
of the Taft-Hartley Act in supporting decisions applying the prohi-
bitions in cases involving the building and construction industry.' 51 The
fact that the Act shows special concern for disputes typical of the in-
dustry is the basis for this reasoning. 152 True, it lends support to cov-
erage of some of the industry, but there is no intimation that the entire
industry must be included. Mr. Denham's view is that small as well
as large employers are entitled to protection of the Act against unfair
union practices. During the debates in Congress Senator Ball said the
small businessman who employs from fifty to one hundred employees
is the one who chiefly needs protection from secondary boycotts and
jurisdictional strikes.'5 Supplemental views of four members of the
Senate Committee on Labor and Education pointed out that it is the
small employers, often with less than 50 employees and farmers or farm
truckers who are in the main victims of secondary boycotts and juris-
dictional disputes. 154
Statements by members of Congress also indicate an intention to
limit application of the Act. Senator Taft has remarked several times
since enactment of the statute that it should not apply to the entire
building and construction industry.155 The special subcommittee of the
House of Representatives which investigated Mr. Denham's plan of
' Ira A. Watson Co., 80 N. L. R. B. No. 91 (1948); United Brotherhood of
Carpenters and Joiners of America, 81 N. L. R. B. No. 127 (1949)."I2 See, Sen. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 22, 54 (1947) ; 93 Cong. Rec.
3329-3330, 3534, 4255, 4323, 5040, 5143, 7506 (April-June 1947).
93 Cong. Rec. 5040 (May 9, 1947).
' Sen. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 54 (1947).
' 93 Cong. Rec. A3579 (June 8, 1947).
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extensive coverage under the Act thought small mercantile or industrial
enterprises doing a local business should not be brought within the terms
of the Act.15" The so-called "watchdog" committee set up by the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947 also believed that small local busi-
nesses, retail service establishments, should not be subject to the Act.15 7
These statements by Members of Congress who helped draft the pro-
visions may be important in interpreting the Act, but they would carry
little weight in determining the constitutional limits of the commerce
power. In any case post-legislative statements would be of little value.
The legislative history is quite conflicting, but there is no doubt of a
great deal of sentiment in Congress that small concerns should be ex-
empt. However, the sentiments become mixed when protection of
small employers from secondary boycotts is at stake.'i 8
THEORIES ON WHICH JURISDICTION MAY BE LIMITED
Decisions of the courts are not very helpful in determining the limits
of the power of the Labor Board. The cases have served only to ex-
tend the concept of the Board's jurisdiction and the application of the
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947. In view of the sweeping
language of the cases, it is somewhat difficult to determine just what
means might be used to limit the Board's jurisdiction. It is submitted
that two theories will be advanced in this delineation of power: one,
the maxim de ininimis, and the other the gradual shaping of the boundary
between state and federal control of labor relations.
A. THE de Minimis RULE
The de minimis doctrine as limiting the coverage of the National
Labor Relations Act originated in the Fainblatt case'01 when the Court
recognized that commerce of small volume would not fall within the
operation of the Act. The standard has little meaning at present for
no decision denying jurisdiction has used it as a measure. The doctrine
is used in defending almost every case challenging coverage and the
term is frequently mentioned in discussions of the power of the Board,
yet Judge Clark in the Suburban Lumber Company case0 0 is the only
one who has given real meaning to the term as applied to the Labor
Board cases. He would give it the common-law meaning of "matters
of a few dollars or less." If this is the true meaning, jurisdiction prob-
'88 H. R. Rep. No. 2050, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. 14 (1949).Sen. Rep. No. 986, Part 3, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. 14 (1949).
"'Hearings before Subcommittees of the Committee on Education and Labor
and the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments on Investiga-
tion to Ascertain Scope of Interpretation by General Counsel of National Labor
Relations Board of the Term "Affecting Commerce," as Used in the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act, 1947, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. 26 (1948).
"' NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U. S. 601, 607 (1939).
"80 NLRB v. Suburban Lumber Co., 121 F. 2d 829 (3d Cir. 1941). Cf. Grone-
man & Groneman v. I. B. E. W., 17 CCH Lab. Cas. No. 65,410 (10th Cir. 1949)
where the court held the Taft-Hartley Act not applicable to a situation where
the building contractor purchased $6,000 worth of materials out of the state.
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ably extends as far as urged by Mr. Denham. But in a different con-
text there is no reason why it should be restricted to the common-law
meaning. It is believed that matters of small import should not require
the Board's attention. With labor disputes involving representation
and unfair labor practices over the entire nation centralized in one
board of five members, the Board could not cope with all disputes in-
volving only a few dollars or less. The Labor Board has recognized
this in dismissing many cases on administrative grounds. If the Board
is required to take jurisdiction in all secondary boycott and jurisdictional
dispute cases within its constitutional power, it is likely a, good many
decisions will appear denying the power of the Board. The problem
would have been faced already had it not been for the exercise of ad-
ministrative discretion. There is still ample room under the decisions
of the Supreme Court to hold that de minimis has some real significance
in excluding many small employers from the operation of the Act. The
author believes that some rough standard could be used, such as em-
ployers who hire no more than fifty workers and whose annual inter-
state business amounts to less than $100,000. Under this standard
thousands of small enterprises, such as small contractors and small re-
tail stores, could claim exemption under the doctrine de minimis, which
is really a counterpart of the "substantial effect on commerce" criteria.
B. THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL CONTROL
The conflict of state and federal authority over labor disputes in
intrastate commerce is growing apace. As an original proposition, it
would seem that since express power was not given to Congress to
regulate intrastate commerce, nor was its regulation by the states pro-
hibited, under well established constitutional doctrine it should fall in
the powers reserved to the states. But the history of legiglation in the
field of regulation of commerce has found the states seeking to extend
their power over certain phases of interstate commerce and the federal
government equally zealous in extending its power over local trade. 61
The results has been something of a compromise with each invading the
field of the other when the issues do not involve fundamental control.
Out of the hodge-podge of cases has developed the theory of functional
federalism. Since the Constitution cannot be interpreted by mechanical
means, it is delineated from case to case as the demand arises and is
likely to be--steeped in the necessity of the situation. For example, in
Wickard v. Filb urn, the federal power was found to extend over pro-
duction of grain for consumption on a farm, for to deny this power
. For a general discussion of the problem see: CORWIN, THE COMMERCE
POWER VERSUS STATES RIGHTS (1936); ROTTSCHAEFER, THE CONSTITUTION AND
Soclo-EcONOMIC CHANGE (1948) Ch. II, III, V; Powell, Current Conflicts Be-
tween the Commerce Clause and State Police Power 1922-1927, 12 MINN. L. REV
321, 470, 565 (1928).
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would be to negate the effectiveness of control over interstate markets.
Expanding control by both the federal and state governments in the
field of labor relations since 1935 has made the problem a particularly
acute one in this area of governance. Under the Wagner Act the NLRB
had a working arrangement with the New York State Labor Relations
Board to permit disputes in many local industries to be handled by the
state authorities. Provision was made in the Taft-Hartley Act to per-
mit the NLRB to cede jurisdiction to state agencies when the state
statute was not inconsistent with the corresponding provisions of the
federal statute.162  Since no state statute meets this requirement, no
agreements have been made under this provision.
The Supreme Court has been faced with the problem of state and
federal control in several recent cases and the tenor of the decisions is
to recognize the paramount authority of the federal government, though
state action has been upheld, even in the area of interstate commerce,
where the NLRB has not entered the field and there was no inconsistent
federal statute. When the NLRB asserted general jurisdiction over
unionization of foremen, the New York State Labor Relations Board
was precluded from operating in the field though the NLRB had re-
fused to act in this particular instance on administrative grounds.1'
Yet states have been permitted to make regulations more stringent than
those administered by the NLRB when such action is not inconsistent
with the policy and purposes of the federal statute; states have been
permitted to outlaw union security contracts 64 or to make stricter re-
quirements in elections for a union shop.165 These cases have arisen in
areas where federal jurisdiction is frequently exercised; cases challeng-
ing federal control on the ground that the labor dispute has no sub-
stantial effect on interstate commerce will present an even more
challenging question.
Under the theories previously advanced, jurisdiction of the NLRB
could extend over entire industries, leaving no room for state action.
However, even in the decisions recognizing the broad powers of the
Board, one finds the threads of an idea that somewhere there must be
a limit to federal jurisdiction to provide state governments with an
unchallenged area of authority.6 6 Also there is some foundation for
162 Section 10(a).
103 Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, 330 U. S.
767 (1947). See also, La Crosse Telephone Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Re-
lations Board, 69 S. Ct. 379 (1949) where state jurisdiction was denied when it
had a standard different from that administered by the NLRB.
I" Lincoln Federal Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 69 S. Ct. 251
(1949).
"'5 Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,
69 S. Ct. 584 (1949).
... As Professor T. R. Powell has remarked, "Congress must not be allowed to
roam so widely that there will not be enough reserve space for the exclusive
roaming of the states." Commerce, Pensions and Codes, 49 HARv. L. REV. 193,
211 (1935).
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believing state authorities have some special competence in local ;egu-
lation. A resurgence of state authority may stay the tendency to cen-
tralization; the defenders of state control will quote the words of Chief
Justice Hughes that:
The authority of the federal government may not be pushed to such an
extreme as to destroy the distinction, which the commerce clause itself
establishes, between commerce "among the several states" and the in-
ternal concerns of a State. That distinction between what is national
and what is local in the activities of commerce is vital to the maintenance
of our federal system.'
67
Mr. Justice Frankfurter gives further support to a limitation based on
this theory when he stated in the Polish National Alliance case that
"interpenetrations of modern society have not wiped out state lines."'168
He further warns that "scholastic reasoning may prove that no activity
is isolated within the boundary of a single state, but that cannot
justify absorption of legislative power by the United States over every
activity."1
69
The implications of Mr. Denham's theory, that the Labor Board has
jurisdiction over almost every business enterprise, coupled with the
Bethlehem Steel170 decision, which would exclude state action in that
area, would leave little need for state action in the field of labor relations,
for the Taft-Hartley Act may be deemed a complete code in this field.
The reluctance of the NLRB to enter the field of small business enter-
prises, illustrated by its many decisions declining jurisdiction, based
partly on the huge case load which would result from coverage of the
entire field, is supporting evidence that an area does exist for the ex-
clusive operation of state law. The issues are primarily local and can
best be handled by agencies familiar with the local problems. An oppos-
ing argument based on a uniform national policy is chiefly theoretical
when there is no evidence the labor dispute has a potential of widespread
proportions. It is not a matter of limiting the legislative power, it
involves only a decision as to whether it shall lie in the state or federal
government.
PROPOSED LEGISLATION DEFINING NLRB JURISDICTION
The uncertain limits of the powers of the NLRB have perplexed
businessmen and unions alike. When the legality of a discharge of an
employee depends upon a question of application of state or federal law,
the employer desires advance knowledge of which law is controlling.
This unsettled state of the law has caused the General Counsel of the
"" NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 30 (1937)..8 Polish National Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U. S. 643, 650 (1944).
...Id. at 650."7o Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, 330 U. S.
767 (1947).
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NLRB, the Joint Committee on Labor-Management Relations and others
to call for clarification of the issue by legislation.171 A great deal of
thought has been given to the problem by the NLRB, the General Coun-
sel's office and by various congressional committees, but no one has
offered an entirely satisfactory solution.
It would not be unusual in legislative practice to set up exemptions
of certain small enterprises. The Fair Labor Standards Act exempts
from its provisions "any employee engaged in any retail or service estab-
lishment, the greater part of whose selling or servicing is in intrastate
commerce."' 72 The difficulties arising out of this exemption caused the
drafters of the proposed amendments to the FLSA to exempt from the
operation of the Act:
.. any retail or service establishment whose employer had a total vol-
ume of sales or servicing or not more than $500,000 during the preceding
calendar year. An establishment shall not be deemed a retail or service
establishment within the meaning of this subsection if more than twenty-
five percentum of its annual dollar volume during the preceding calendar
year was derived from activities other than retail selling or servicing.,' 3
A similar exemption in the NLRB could be easily applied in cases
where jurisdiction is based on movement of goods in interstate com-
merce, but it would have little meaning in cases where the business enter-
prise itself has no interstate commerce, yet its effect on commerce is
sufficient to warrant an exercise of the Board's powers.
Limitations of jurisdiction based on mathematical formula could in-
clude total volume of interstate commerce, percentage of business in
interstate commerce, or the number of employees in the business enter-
prise. The Joint Committee on Labor-Management Relations suggested
some formula be presented based on the number of employees in com-
bination with interstate sales. It is believed a formula based on twenty-
five employees and $100,000 intdrstate business would be a fair limit
of coverage. The NLRB could operate in a wide field and leave a good
many local situations to the local boards. This would achieve only a
very rough justice and would by no means be a certain test of what
"substantially affects interstate commerce." But the very nature of the
question makes impossible a perfect test.
A mathematical formula could be set up to take into consideration
other factors which have influenced assertions of jurisdiction in the past.
Following is a suggested amendment to Section 7 of the present NLRA:
... Sen. Rep. No. 986 Pt. 3, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. 14 (1949); Hearings be-
fore the Joint Committee on Labor Management Relations, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess.
1161 (1949). Chairman Herzog believes the legislative remedy may be worse than
the disease. Id. at 1137.
272 29 U. S. C. A. §213A (1940).
"' H. R. Rep. No. 267, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 9, §13(a) (1949).
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(b) The business of an employer shall not be found to affect com-
merce within the meaning of the Act where the principal basis for such
finding would be in the inflow and outflow of goods or services across
state lines to or from the employer, unless such employer:
(1) Receives directly across state lines goods or services at the an-
nual rate of $100,000 or more in value, or
(2) Sends or causes to be sent directly across state lines goods or
services at the annual rate of $50,000 or more in value, or
(3) Receives goods at the annual rate of $200,000 or more in value
from one or more persons or firms who received directly from out
of state such goods in essentially the same condition as when for-
warded to the employer, or
(4) Sends or causes to be sent goods at the annual rate of $100,000
or more in value to one or more persons or firms who forward di-
rectly out of state such goods in essentially the same condition as
when received from the employer, or
(5) Receives, sends or causes to be sent, in the manner described in
paragraphs (1), (2), (3) or (4) of this subsection, goods or serv-
ices at a combined annual rate of $200,000 or more in value, provided,
that in arriving at the combined annual rate, the actual value of any
goods or services received or sent as in paragraphs (1) and (4) of
this subsection shall be multiplied by two, and the actual value of any
goods or services sent as in paragraph (2) shall be multiplied by four.
(c) These limitations in subsection (b) shall not apply (1) where
the business of the employer is an integral part of a firm which is en-
gaged in commerce, or (2) where the products or activities of .the em-
ployer are an essential element in the business of a firm which is engaged
in commerce. 174
The word "rate" implies a continuing inflow of materials and elimi-
nates consideration of capital goods, which is current practice in Board
decisions.' 75 The amendment also gives effect to a belief that goods
coming to rest within the state and goods moving direct to the employer
from out of state should not be given as much weight in determining
coverage as goods moving from the employer to other states. This idea
is based on the extent and rapidity with which commerce would be
affected by labor disputes in the employer's business. The amounts are
suggestive, but the ratio has some basis in fact.
The same result might be achieved without legislation if the Labor
Board would promulgate rules setting forth the policy of its assertions
of jurisdiction. Precedent is found in the interpretative bulletins of the
Wage and Hour Administrator stating the policy under which the
FLSA will be administered. Such a statement by the NLRB would give
employers, employees and unions something solid on which to judge
coverage instead of leaving them to rely on decisions of doubtful mean-
ing which may be departed from at any time.
' 7 The author is indebted to Mr. George Squillacote, Legal Assistant to the
NLRB, for suggestions regarding this proposed amendment.
175 Richter Transfer Co., 80 N. L. R. B. No. 186 (1948),
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CONCLUSION
If the NLRB wishes to assert it, coverage of a large area of the
building and construction industry is indicated by the foregoing discus-
sion. The extent of asserted coverage will depend somewhat on the
theory adopted in the particular case. Industry-wide coverage might be
achieved to effectuate the policies of the Act and to make the law apply
uniformly throughout the industry. The author believes jurisdiction
will not extend over so broad an area. Jurisdiction in most cases will
depend upon" the volume of goods moving in interstate commerce affected
by the labor dispute and it is this theory which affords an opportunity
for holding that many small" contractors and their employees are not
covered by the Act.
It may be helpful to categorize the industry for a closer examination.
The industry could be classified as follows: (1) heavy construction:
dams, highways, roads and bridges; (2) construction for interstate in-
strumentalities: telephone, telegraph, railroads, post offices and ware-
houses; (3) industrial construction: new manufacturing plants and new
units in existing plants; (4) commercial construction: office buildings
and stores; (5) public and semi-public buildings: schools, hospitals,
churches and government buildings; (6) housing.
Since the work is an intimate part of interstate commerce, the first
and second groups would certainly be covered. Construction of new
plants intended for manufacturing goods for interstate commerce and
construction of new units in existing plants manufacturing goods for
interstate commerce should be within the Board's power; plant con-
struction must precede production.' 78  Cases applying the FLSA and
the NLRA to building maintenance employees 77 would lend support to
extension of the Board's power over construction of office buildings
whose prospective tenants will be engaged in interstate commerce. If
the future tenants will not be engaged in interstate commerce, jurisdic-
tion could be based on the interstate movement of construction materials
substantially affecting commerce.
Jurisdiction over construction of department stores can be based on
the interstate movement of construction materials or on the fact that the
store will be the throat for distribution of goods moving in interstate
commerce. The work is similar to the construction of a warehouse for
goods moving in interstate commerce. The reasoning which supports
the Board's authority over store employees is available to assert juris-
... Cf. Warren Bradshaw Co. v. Hall, 317 U. S. 88 (1949) (employee drilling
oil well who stopped short of completion of the well was subject to the FLSA
since this drilling was a necessary part of the productive process and there was
reasonable grounds to anticipate that oil would move to other states).
""1 Borden Co. v. Borella, 325 U. S. 679 (1945) ; Butler Bros. v. NLRB, 134
F. 2d 981 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 789 (1943).
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diction over the workmen who construct the building. The argument
for coverage of construction of schools, churches and government build-
ings would be based on interstate movement of construction materials.
Inclusion or exclusion would depend upon the volume of commerce
affected by the labor dispute. Housing construction can be divided into
apartment houses, housing developments and single dwelling units. The
volume of material required for construction would ordinarily be suffi-
cient in the first two categories to substantially affect interstate com-
merce. Construction of single units may come near the border-line of
the Board's authority. Though the volume of materials required for a
single dwelling may be only a few thousand dollars, this would be
sufficient to come within the de minimis rule. If a contractor built
several houses a year, the effect of his total construction could be
considered.
Another ground on which jurisdiction over many small construction
jobs can be based will be the far-reaching effect of the labor dispute due
to the likelihood the dispute will spread to other projects. It is believed
that ordinarily small construction jobs, such as single dwellings, should
not be within the Board's power, but the likelihood that the labor dispute
will spread is presented as the touchstone to determine coverage of small
projects and if this element is lacking, local law should govern.
Whatever the limit of jurisdiction in the building and construction
industry may be, it will be pricked out in a series of hard fought de-
cisions; and, with the NLRB declining jurisdiction in some cases on
policy grounds, uncertainty will reign supreme for a long time to come.
Probably we should join the chorus requesting Congress to be more
specific in defining the coverage under the Labor Relations Act.
